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1. This report aims to evaluate the performance of the Auction for Landscape 
Recovery (ALR), and to provide the key success factors and impediments for 
conservation auction schemes in Australia. 
2. Preparation of this report was based on developing and applying a methodology for 
judging the project’s successes and failures and determining the associated key 
success factors and impediments. Judgments regarding success, failure, and the 
associated factors, were based on whether the project objectives were met; and 
whether criteria drawn from conservation planning and environmental policy 
evaluation were evident in the project’s execution and products. 
3. The pilot succeeded in applying two selection methods, systematic conservation 
planning (SCP) and an environmental benefits index (EBI), although only the SCP 
(with EBI information imbedded in it) was used to make the actual tender 
selections. The assessment of multiple environmental benefits proved problematic.  
The project’s on-ground outcomes included enhanced protection for priority  
biodiversity assets. 
4. The project succeeded in that sufficient data of a sufficient quality was acquired 
and analysed for tender selections to be made. Factors related to having sufficient 
data to make tender selections included: (a) access to both digitised, spatial data 
and field-collected, site-specific data; and (b) assistance in evaluating the tenders 
from an expert group. 
5. A total of 23% of landholders, 7 out of the 31 of those who tendered and been 
surveyed to provide these data, were new to agri-environmental schemes. The 
tender process seemed politically and socially acceptable to those landholders 
involved. 
6. Data from the ALR pilot auction suggest a significant increase in efficiency over an 
input-based and an output-based uniform price scheme of 315 and 207% 
respectively. The project succeeded in that the underpinning economic ideas were 
sound, and the auction design and contracting arrangements could be efficiently 
and effectively implemented. 
7. For most landholders in the WA wheatbelt, salinity remains their highest priority 
irrespective of this project’s objectives. In WA (and elsewhere), most landholders 
remain focused on production concerns and the business of farming. However, 
there is some evidence that the ALR succeeded in focusing the tendering process 
on biodiversity actions. 
8. Key success factors included the following: 
a. The availability of appropriate computer software and spatial data, and the 
compatability of the ecological and economic models used. 
b. The availability of a person with insights into the mechanisms and the 
technical skills and ability to integrate data and communicate the process to 
a diverse range of people in the project team. 
c. The development of an enthusiastic and committed project team, which 
combined practical and academic expertise, who frequently contributed 
more time and resources to the project than the actual budget provided for.  
 
 
d. The availability of resources to be able to employ community support 
officers and having these locally based. 
e. Using an expert reference group to facilitate decision-making. To a large 
extent they replaced a formal analysis of feasibility and likelihood of 
success of projects. 
f. Two bidding rounds, with transfer of learnings from the first to second 
round. 
9. Key impediments included: 
a. The constraints imposed by project timeframe and budget. 
b. The methodology behind the EBI is complex and requires a large amount of 
expert assessment at different scales. 
c. The inability to develop or use effective management benefit analysis and 
threat/risk analysis.  
d. The SCP process is difficult to communicate, given its conceptual and 
computational complexity.  
e. Appropriate spatial data are not available ‘off the shelf’ or from a central 
location in Western Australia for use at a regional scale of analysis. 
f. The complex nature of biodiversity patterns in the extremely diverse SW 
ecoregion confound the application of simple mapping, selection and 
prioritisation processes. 
10. Problems encountered during the project, over and above those arising from 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background to project and purpose of this report 
In 2003 the Commonwealth Government of Australia established and funded 10 pilot 
projects to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility of selected market based 
instruments as means of effecting improvements in natural resource management. The 
pilots have included auctions, tenders, cap and trade and insurance-based instruments 
(CoA 2005). The Auction for Landscape Recovery (ALR) is a Western Australian pilot 
project, running over two years (2003-2005) and based on a voluntary land and nature 
conservation auction conducted over two rounds in the wheatbelt agricultural region of the 
Avon River Basin of Western Australia. Comprehensive details on the design and 
execution of the ALR project can be found in the project’s final report (forthcoming as of 
May 2005).  
The ALR pilot project was designed to test a number of features of auctions as a specific 
market-based instrument, as detailed in seven project objectives (Table 1). These 
objectives focus on evaluating the instrument design and its implementation; they do not 
explicitly address or require reporting on the achievement of environmental or biodiversity 
outcomes. This pilot project has been managed by WWF Australia, with partners including 
CSIRO, the University of Western Australia, the Avon Catchment Council, the North 
Eastern Wheatbelt Regional Organisation of Councils, the Department of Conservation and 
Land Management, Murdoch University and others.  
WWF, with its partners, is responsible for reporting on achievement of the seven 
objectives to the Commonwealth Government. This report forms part of these reporting 
responsibilities. It has two aims: 
A. To evaluate the performance of the ALR; and  
B. To provide the key success factors and impediments for conservation auction 
schemes in Australia.  
 
  2 
 
Table 1 ALR project objectives from the project proposal 
OBJECTIVE DETAIL 
1. To test two alternative selection 
methodologies for assessing the relative 
benefits of individual actions by private 
landholders against quantitative 
biodiversity targets. 
o Relative biodiversity conservation benefits that 
stem from the tender selections resulting from 
the two distinct methodologies 
o The extent to which the two methodologies 
select actions that provide multiple 
environmental benefits.  
2. To evaluate the minimum information 
needs for applying an auction approach to 
delivery of NRM at a regional scale. 
o The marginal value of datasets in determining 
environmental outcomes from the tender 
selection process.  
3. To evaluate the relative benefits of a 
discriminative price auction versus a fixed 
price scheme and existing Landcare 
schemes. 
o The difference in recruitment of landholder 
tenders 
o The number and % of tendering landholders 
that are new to Landcare activities for 
biodiversity conservation 
o The change in overall quality and quantity of 
environmental outcomes supplied (i.e. has the 
auction approach delivered a change in the 
work that landholders propose such that there is 
a change in (potential) outcomes?) 
4. To analyse administrative efficiency of 
a discriminative price auction versus fixed 
price schemes. 
o The difference in the proportion of 
administrative costs required to implement the 
auction versus a fixed –price scheme 
5. To analyse communication strategies 
with landholders. 
o The relative awareness of landholders of 
ecological threats (i.e. has their awareness of 
what the auction is trying to achieve been 
enhanced?) 
6. To identify and define the ‘key success 
factors’ and ‘key impediments’ for 
conservation auction schemes in Australia 
and the factors which are likely to be 
regionally sensitive. 
o Differences in the auction results between the 
different landscape types in the trial area* 
o Differences in the auction information 
requirements, landholder engagement, quantity 
and quality of bids and management 
interventions; administrative and 
communication costs, of the WA pilot and the 
Victorian and NSW (Liverpool Plains) 
conservation auction trials.  
7. To communicate the pilot results to 
regional NRM groups and other 
stakeholders regionally, nationally and 
internationally. 
o  
* This point was not evaluated for two reasons: first, only one broadly similar landscape type 
underlies the trial area and second, the number of landholders was too small to be able to divide the 
sample and get meaningful results.  
 




Preparation of this report was based on developing and applying a methodology for 
judging the project’s successes and failures. A central part of this applying this 
methodology was determining the associated key success factors and impediments. 
Judgments regarding success, failure, and the associated factors, were based on: 
(1) Whether the project objectives (Table 1) were met; and  
(2) Whether criteria drawn from conservation planning and environmental policy 
evaluation (Tables 2 and 3) were evident in the project’s execution and products. 
Table 2 Ecological principles for economic instruments directed towards terrestrial 
biodiversity conservation  
Principle Explanation 
Representative samples of all 
ecosystems protected 
Ecosystem diversity is important and every ecosystem type 
should be conserved in the landscape. Encompasses the ideas of 
comprehensiveness and representativeness. 
Sites contribute to meta-
population viability 
Species populations have the greatest likelihood of persistence 
if habitat is of sufficient area, is distributed in space to reduce 
vulnerability to single disturbances, and is sufficiently 
connected to enable movements of individuals or propagules 
between subpopulations 
Sites in best condition given 
priority 
Sites in the best relative condition are more likely to retain 
greater diversity than sites in a highly modified condition. 
Vulnerable ecosystems afforded 
priority 
Conservation priorities should be based (partially) on the 
likelihood that an ecosystem will be degraded or lost without 
immediate conservation action. This must be tempered by the 
likelihood that the ecosystem or site is responsive to 
management. 
Ecological processes supported 
through time 
Ecosystems rely on processes such as disturbance, 
regeneration, dispersal and water and nutrient flux. 
Management of threatening processes is also often required. 
Source: Gibbons et al. (2002) 
Table 2 draws on ecological principles that have been suggested for economic policy 
instruments associated with biodiversity (e.g. Gibbons et al. 2002). These principles are 
well established in the conservation literature, and frequently used in practice. Their use 
may still, however, lead to unresolved issues since the criteria can be mutually exclusive – 
for instance vulnerable ecosystems may by their nature not be present anywhere in good 
condition.  
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Table 3 Policy evaluation criteria for determining the ‘best’ policy instruments for 




Trade-offs created by the instrument are achieved at least cost and 
the reassignment of property rights makes at least some one better off 




Instrument creates minimal enforcement and monitoring costs, and 





Instrument improves the availability and exchange of information 
between those involved in policy development and implementation. 
Politically and 
socially acceptable 
Instrument motivates people, and is regarded as legitimately 
formulated and delivered, consistent with government policy and has 
bipartisan support. 
Equitable The instrument, now or in the future, disadvantages no individual or 
group. 
Flexible Instrument can cope with changing technology, prices and climate, as 
well as encouraging innovation and improvement in biodiversity 
beyond official policy targets. 
Dependable Instrument will deliver the desired target even when knowledge 
about biodiversity, and the social and economic consequences of the 
instrument, are uncertain. 
Precautionary Instrument avoids the chance of serious, irreversible consequences, 
especially where there is scientific uncertainty. 
Targeted Instrument enables areas of high/significant conservation value to be 
identified and managed. 
Educational Those influenced by the instrument become better informed about 
biodiversity. 
Sources: Young and Gunningham (1997), Stoneham et al. (2000), Banting et al. (2001), Moore 
(2001), Stoneham (2003) 
Table 3 was sourced from efforts in Australia and elsewhere to develop criteria for 
evaluating biodiversity policies and instruments (e.g. Young and Gunningham 1997). 
Researchers have drawn on the widely used stalwarts of policy evaluation – efficiency, 
effectiveness and equity – as well as recommending criteria specific to sustainability, such 
as precaution and community acceptability, and to biodiversity concerns, such as 
dependability.  
The Commonwealth Government suggested four factors thought to contribute to the 
success or failure of the market-based instrument (MBI) pilots (Anon. 2004, Table 4).  
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Table 4 Factors thought to contribute to the success or failure of the MBI pilots 
Factor Description KTS section number  
Mechanism 
design 
• Methods employed to assist with design and 




• Metrics employed and scientific/ecological basis 






• Adequacy or otherwise of planning and 
organisational support. 
6.1.3  
Engaging agents • Mechanisms employed to exchange 
rights/contracts services. 
• Key change agents and associated mechanisms. 
6.1.4 [also KTS 5: 
identify key change 
agents] 
Source: Anon. (2004) 
 
Information sources 
Sources of information for this evaluation included: our observations from and 
participation in project meetings; review and analysis of project documentation; and 
interviews with team members. The results draw on all these sources unless specified 
otherwise. Observation and participation by the authors occurred at several science team 
meetings over the life of the project. Both authors actively participated in a 2-day project 
evaluation workshop by the science team in March 2005 and one of the authors in a half-
day partner’s meeting in April 2005.  
Documents reviewed included an interim and quarterly reports prepared for the 
Commonwealth Government (Appendix) and conference/workshop papers by project 
partners (e.g. Clayton 2005). Final reports from the project partners were to provide the 
core documentation for this evaluation. As not all were not available when this report was 
prepared, greater reliance was placed on the afore-mentioned sources.  
Informal face-to-face interviews were conducted with most of the science team members 
towards the end of the project (April 2005). Included were: The University of Western 
Australia – Michael Burton, Helena Clayton and Ben White; CSIRO (by phone) – Kristen 
Williams; WWF – Chris Curnow and Cheryl Gole. Questions covered the project’s 
successes, shortcomings and associated factors.  
 
Analysis 
The following analysis (in sections 2.0 & 4.0) has been organised according to the parts of 
the project: tender evaluation methodology, environmental data requirements, auction 
design and contracts, project management and resources, and communicating with 
landholders. The project successes and failures, and associated factors and impediments, 
are presented according to the part of the project where they most influenced success or 
failure. A comparison of this project with the Liverpool Plains Land Management Tender 
(NSW) and BushTender (Victoria), as required by Objective 6 of the ALR pilot (Table 1), 
is included. The key success factors and impediments, as derived from these analyses, are 
given in section 3.0. No evaluation against Objective 7 is included as the associated tasks 
were still underway when this analysis was done.  
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For each part of the analysis (e.g. tender evaluation methodology), the successes, failures 
and factors have been detailed. Although it might be tempting to progress immediately to 
the key success factors and impediments, it was absolutely essential to clearly identify 
what the successes and/or failures of the project have been, evaluated against some 
standards or expectations. The ‘expectations’ or standards are here provided by the project 
objectives (Table 1) and evaluation criteria (Tables 2 & 3). As such, each of the following 
sections begins with these expectations and explicitly notes the related successes and/or 
failures. Only then is detail provided on the associated success factors and impediments, 
and finally the key factors. The Commonwealth success factors (Table 4, Anon. 2004) are 
also included in the boxes at the beginning of each section to assist with analysis.  
Although we have presented the successes and failures with some confidence (given their 
judgment against the project objectives and criteria from the literature), our ascription of 
causality between the factors and project successes or failures must be treated with more 
caution. We have used our professional judgement, and of the project partners, to describe 
these factors. They should be regarded as being based on the best information available but 
interpreting their part in success or failure should be done with caution. A comparison 
across the 10 market-based instrument pilot projects would greatly improve their 
robustness and our confidence in their explanatory power (Yin 1994).  
 
2.0 Successes, failures, associated factors and impediments 
 
2.1 Tender evaluation methodology 
Relevant project objective (from Table 1):  
(1) To test two alternative selection methodologies for assessing the relative benefits of 
individual actions by private landholders against quantitative biodiversity targets. 
Conservation planning evaluation criteria: All (from Table 2). 
Relevant Commonwealth success factor (from Table 4): None.  
Evaluation of successes 
Did the pilot succeed in detailing the relative biodiversity benefits of the two 
methods? (first part of the Detail against Objective 1 – Table 1)  
The pilot succeeded in applying two selection methods, systematic conservation planning 
(SCP) and an environmental benefits index (EBI), although only the SCP (with EBI 
information imbedded in it) was used to make the actual tender selections. The two 
methods use measures of different things in different contexts and provide different types 
of output – the EBI provides an estimate of EBI/$ while SCP provides contribution to 
target/$. Also, the SCP is primarily a regional planning tool whereas the EBI is 
predominantly designed to work on a site-by-site basis. Regarding relative performance, it 
appears that the SCP provided a more efficient solution in terms of achieving conservation 
outcomes within the constraints of the project.  
Did the pilot succeed in detailing the extent to which the two methodologies select 
actions that provide multiple environmental benefits? (second part of the Detail against 
Objective 1 – Table 1)  
It appears that, in the end, the assessment of multiple environmental benefits proved 
problematic.  The assessment of biodiversity benefits alone was difficult (see following 
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section), and the addition of other environmental benefits was hampered by the 
unavailability of useful predictive techniques by which to assess the likely environmental 
outcomes of particular management actions. A further problem was the mismatch in scale 
between proposed management actions arising out of the ALR process and the likely 
system responses. A key example of this is in relation to salinity and ground and surface 
water flows. The management actions proposed under the auction scheme were very 
unlikely to have much impact at the landscape scale at which these water processes 
operate.  
Did the pilot succeed in meeting the conservation planning evaluation criteria? (Table 
2) 
The project’s on-ground outcomes included enhanced protection for the following set of 
biodiversity assets: 
• Complementary bushland remnants. 
• Naturally saline wetlands. 
• Granite outcrops and rocky ridges. 
• Listed threatened species. 
• Untargeted species vulnerable to fox predation. 
The main planning criteria to which these outcomes are relevant are the complementarity 
and protection of vulnerable ecosystems although some funded projects also considered 
metapopulation viability and ecosystem processes.  In heavily cleared areas such as the 
study region, virtually any conservation action (provided it is feasible) is liable to have 
some impact on the factors covered by the planning criteria.  
 
Success factors 
The success factors associated with the tender evaluation methodology included: (1) using 
ecological and economic models that were conceptually and methodologically similar; (2) 
having access to suitable data and the skills needed to manipulate and interpret these data; 
and (3) the pilot nature of the project that successfully brought research and practice 
together.  
1. The ecological (SCP) and economic models worked well together. They did so because 
both rely on similar methods – constrained optimisation. The SCP TARGET software 
has been designed to capture trade-offs, as does economic modelling. It also helped 
that the models used (e.g. TARGET) were available ‘off the shelf’ but could still be 
modified as needed. Other reasons why the models worked well together were because 
those involved were experts in their fields and were willing to cooperate.  
2. This is the first time SCP has been used to fund on-ground actions, here in an auction-
type policy instrument. It has previously been used for conservation reserve selection. 
It worked because of CSIRO’s commitment to acquire the data needed, because the 
software already existed, and because the integrator (K. Williams, CSIRO) was able to 
efficiently and effectively integrate data and work across relevant components to pull 
the whole thing together.  
3. Research and practice were effectively brought together to produce useful management 
outcomes (funding provided to landholders for on-ground works) and research 
outcomes (testing of conservation planning and economic theory in real world setting). 
This was possible because of the pilot nature of this project (with research-focused 
project objectives) as well as the commitment to real world activities. This made the 
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project exciting for the researchers involved and contributed to the enormous amount 
of goodwill (=unpaid contribution) they made to the project and hence its success.  
 
Shortcomings and associated impediments 
There were also some failures or shortcomings associated with the selection 
methodologies, a number of them related to the EBI. Included were: (1) the time and effort 
required to construct an EBI and conduct the necessary assessments; (2) difficulties in 
assessing elements of the index, such as current condition; (3) difficulties in determining 
biodiversity management benefits; (4) ditto for multiple benefits; and (5) difficulties in 
explaining the SCP methodology.  
1. The EBI proved difficult for a number of reasons. The EBI is an example of a 
composite index, which aims to provide a simple method of determining benefits of 
particular management actions (e.g., inclusion of particular remnant areas in a reserve 
network, fencing remnant vegetation etc). In fact, the methodology behind the EBI is 
complex and requires a large amount of assessment at different scales, which can only 
be carried out by experienced/knowledgeable individuals, and/or in conjunction with 
an expert reference group. The time and effort required to construct the EBI was not 
recognised at the start of the project. Operationally, the project used SCP as the 
primary tool, with the EBI being fed into SCP as a preference. 
2. Part of the difficulty in using an EBI related to the inability to develop an effective and 
efficient method for assessing various elements of the index, including current 
condition, risks/threats/probability of persistence and management benefit. There are a 
number of contributing factors to this. Firstly, some of the information needed to 
construct the EBI is not available and/or difficult to collect.  The EBI consists of an 
assessment of biodiversity condition (BBI) and outcomes plus an assessment of other 
environmental benefits. However, even the relatively simple requirement of assessing 
current condition is problematic for some of the ecosystem types present in the study 
area.  
3. The task of determining management benefit, for inclusion in the EBI, was perhaps the 
most problematic since there are few available predictive techniques by which the 
likely outcomes of any given management action can be assessed. The LUCIS 
component of the BBI aims to do this, but its application remains fraught with 
problems (Williams 2004). A problem particular to this project was the translation of 
the LUCIS assessment to Western Australian ecosystems.  While it appears that, early 
on in the project, an attempt was made to do this (Andrew Huggett, CSE, Perth), the 
methodology was not documented, and we have been unable to determine how this was 
approached. A reduced level of input from the CSE Perth lab halfway through the 
project meant that any learnings from this initial process were lost. This meant that 
there was no meaningful attempt to apply any type of LUCIS assessment, and this was 
replaced by the MARG assessment of management feasibility.  
4. It is also difficult to judge the merit of multiple benefits when the effects of 
management actions such as deep drainage are unknown. Again, this reflects a broader 
lack of understanding of environmental responses to intervention. This is also difficult 
to explain to landholders in a brief space of time. 
5. The SCP process is difficult to communicate, given its conceptual and computational 
complexity. This means that this part of information provision is likely to remain 
asymmetric even if the funders wished it to be otherwise, i.e. biodiversity value will 
remain ‘concealed’ from landholders.  
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How to do it better in the future 
The following suggestions flow from the issues raised in the previous section: 
1. For TARGET and other similar software packages to be used successfully, there is a 
need to have the skills to use them. Training is needed if their application and adoption 
for conservation planning and management is to be considered more widely. At present 
only a handful of ‘experts’ are able to drive the process. 
2. There is also the potential to refine TARGET to be better able to deal with potential 
inconsistencies relating to aiming to fulfil percentage targets for all ecosystem types. 
Under this methodology, there is the potential for missing opportunities to secure all or 
most of the remaining examples of a rare ecosystem. If a straight target of 10% is set 
for all types, only 10% of a rare ecosystem is selected as well as 10% of a common 
ecosystem.  
3. An effective method for assessing management benefit needs to be developed. In this 
project, the methods used in NSW and Victoria were not followed, for reasons that are 
not apparent from the documentation. As discussed above, however, this is a 
problematic area that still requires considerable intellectual input and practical testing. 
In the end, an expert reference group (MARG) was used to provide some assessment of 
management benefit, and this may have produced a good enough assessment given the 
limited capacity for deeper analysis. There remains a need for better ways of 
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2.2 Environmental data requirements  
Relevant project objective (Table 1):  
(2) To evaluate the minimum information needs for applying an auction approach to delivery 
of NRM at a regional scale.  
Conservation planning evaluation criteria: Not applicable (Table 2).  
Relevant Commonwealth success factor (Table 4): Measurement of outcomes: metrics 
employed and scientific/ecological basis of measurement employed. 
 
Evaluation of successes 
Is there a recommended set of minimum information needs – did the project succeed 
in this respect? (Table 1) 
How did the metrics employed and the scientific/ecological basis of the associated 
measurement contribute to the pilot’s success? (Table 4) 
We are unable to provide a comprehensive answers to these questions without access to the 
final CSIRO report. The project succeeded in that sufficient data of a sufficient quality was 
acquired and analysed for tender selections to be made.  
Success factors 
Factors related to having sufficient data to make tender selections included: (1) access to 
both digitised, spatial data and field-collected, site-specific data; and (2) assistance in 
evaluating the tenders from an expert group. 
(1) Two forms/types of data were used to make the tender selections: spatial data held by 
State Government agencies obtained under a licence agreement and used from the 
complementarity phase and site-specific data collected by the community support officers1 
and landholders. The spatial data, the modified Beard vegetation class data and geological 
data, enabled conservation targets to be set. The Beard classes on their own were too broad 
to be useful in the current context, because the vegetation of the WA wheatbelt is 
comprised of a complex, relatively fine-scale mosaic, which results from the interplay of 
biophysical and historical factors. However, coupling the Beard classes with a geological 
layer provided a finer resolution and included more of the mosaic nature than Beard 
classes alone. It took lots of work to identify an appropriate set of classes on which to base 
targets, but the work from Round 1 was able to be applied more easily in Round 2.  
(2) There was confidence in the quality of the decisions achieved through the use of an 
expert group, the Management Appraisal Review Group (MARG). This group primarily 
assessed project feasibility. The provision of maps and spatial information to the MARG 
by the community support officers contributed to better decisions. In round 2, the 
community support officers produced a good quality farm map that proved invaluable for 
the management appraisal and tendering process and contributed to efficiency and 
effectiveness of this second round. 
 
Shortcomings and associated impediments 
The following comments relate to data issues generally, rather than being restricted to 
‘minimum’ information needs. Issues include: (1) ensuring good quality information is 
                                                
1 The ALR pilot employed 3 part-time community support officers (CSOs) to encourage and 
support landholders to become involved in the project.  
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provided by landholders; (2) limited resolution of available spatial vegetation data; and (3) 
spatial data access and use issues. 
1. In round 1, the information provided by landholders was of limited use and suitability. 
It was initially assumed that landholders could and would include all information 
needed to assess their tender. Round 2 was more prescriptive, with the provision of 
minimum standards related to some management actions (for example, minimum width 
of corridor 40m; minimum species diversity for revegetation = 10 species; site 
preparation, including weed control and ripping, required; large-scale baiting programs 
to be targeted to particular taxa). Landholders could still submit tenders that didn’t 
include these, but it was made clear that the projects would not then be considered 
feasible, and feasibility is the first ‘mask’ (or selection filter) applied to tenders.  
2. Above we identified as a success factor the availability of spatial data, which allowed 
the development of a set of ecosystem types against which targets could be set. 
However, there were also significant limitations relating to using such data for this 
purpose. As discussed above, the Beard vegetation classes are, on their own, virtually 
useless for priority setting within any given region. While the incorporation of 
geological data improved this somewhat, there is still cause for concern given the 
mosaic nature of WA wheatbelt vegetation and the rapid species turnover across the 
landscape (Hobbs and Yates 2003, Hopper and Goia 2004). This is a particular issue in 
the extremely diverse SW ecoregion and one that confounds the application of simple 
selection or prioritisation processes.  
3. The project was slowed down by several issues related to accessing and using spatial 
data: lack of knowledge of the availability of existing data sets; difficulty in accessing 
existing sets in a timely way; and a lack of spatial data. For example, salinity risk data 
were not available in a timely way, except at an unsuitably low level of resolution. 
These access issues proved problematic in Round 1 but were largely resolved in Round 
2. The project was also slowed down by spatial data being available at different and 
disparate scales and residing in different locations/agencies. This is a widespread 
problem in Western Australia. Such data are not available ‘off the shelf’ for use at a 
regional scale of analysis meaning that it is time consuming to convert/interpret for 
regional use. 
 
How to do it better in the future 
Data issues require ongoing consideration. Data availability, scale of resolution and cross-
compatibility are critical factors determining the ease and degree of success with which 
projects such as this can be completed.  This is a key factor likely to impact all regional 
decision-making processes. A prime example in the current context is the need for salinity 
risk data at the appropriate scale. 
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2.3 Auction design and contracting – landholder matters 
Relevant project objective (Table 1): 
(3) To evaluate the relative benefits of a discriminative price auction versus a fixed price 
scheme and existing Landcare schemes. This objective includes evaluating the difference in 
recruitment of landholder tenders and the number and % of tendering landholders that are 
new to Landcare activities for biodiversity conservation. [The last part of this objective is 
covered in section 2.6.] 
Policy evaluation criteria (Table 3): Politically and socially acceptable, equitable.  
Relevant Commonwealth success factors (Table 4): None.  
 
Evaluation of successes 
What was the difference in recruitment between the ALR and existing Landcare 
schemes – the number and % of tendering landholders that are new to Landcare? 
(Objective 3 – Table 1) 
A total of 23% of landholders, 7 out of the 31 of those who tendered and been surveyed to 
provide these data, were new to agri-environmental schemes, although of these 3 had 
undertaken Landcare-type activities in their farms. There was a positive relationship, 
significant at the 5% level, between participation in the ALR and previous success in 
environmental schemes, recent assistance from a Landcare Coordinator and membership of 
a Landcare group. (The other significant influence was crop yield, as a surrogate for 
income). 
Did the pilot succeed in meeting the environmental policy evaluation criteria of 
political acceptability and equity? (Table 3) 
The tender process seemed politically and socially acceptable to those landholders 
involved. For example, of those surveyed by the University of Western Australia (UWA), 
who had participated in the ALR, 30% (n=31) had participated because of its different 
approach to other environmental schemes. The differences were identified as the tender 
approach and flexibility in the content required in the application forms. It was acceptable 
and interesting to a number of the landholders involved. The University of Western 
Australia also surveyed 31 ‘ALR-aware’ non-participants of whom 66% said they would 
participate in the future (5 and above on a 1–7 scale). 
For fairness, 52% of the landholders surveyed (n=31) scored the ALR tender selection 
process at 5 and above (on a 1–7 scale, where 7 was excellent). However, 35% responded 
that they didn’t know whether the process was fair or not. Based on these results, it’s 
difficult to make any meaningful comments on fairness and hence equity.  
 
Success factors 
Particular attention is given here to the influence of design features on participation. Those 
potentially contributing to participation included: (1) the flexibility of a tender-based 
process; (2) simple, clear application forms; (3) locally-based project officers providing 
technical support and enthusiasm; and (4) site visits by these officers.  
1. Landholders, in interviews with UWA, said they liked the flexibility of a tender-based 
process. They liked being able to identify their own projects and develop their own 
budgets (23% of respondents, n=31). Three quarters of the landholders surveyed who 
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commented on the costs involved in the tender submission process were satisfied (74%, 
n=19), where satisfaction was identified as 5 and above on a scale of 1–7. 
2. The landholder-friendly application process contributed to participation. They liked the 
simple, clear documentation, particularly the forms for the Expression of Interest and 
the Tender itself. The guidelines had a mixed reception, with 60% scoring them as 5 
and above on a scale of 1–7 (n=30), while 16% (n=31) were concerned about a lack of 
information on the expected on-ground and ALR outcomes. 
3. The community support officers provided technical support for tender development as 
well as inspiration and enthusiasm. Most landholders (87%), n=30) were satisfied with 
the assistance they received, scoring it as 5 and above on a scale of 1–7. This reliance 
on local technical assistance reflects the findings of Moore and Renton (2002), from 
their work with landholders in the WA wheatbelt. They identified locally based 
Community Landcare Coordinators as important information sources on biodiversity 
management for two-thirds of landholders. 
4. A visit to a landholder’s property to undertake a site assessment (required to provide 
data for the tender selection process) was highly regarded by landholders and 
potentially contributed to their participation. A total of 88% of landholders (n=25) 
scored their satisfaction with the site assessment as 5 and above on a scale of 1–7. 
 
Shortcomings and associated impediments 
Participation may have been reduced by: (1) design features such as lack of ongoing 
funding and the small amount of money available; (2) a lack of landholder understanding 
of the scheme; and (3) concerns regarding the adequacy of feedback to ‘failed bidders’.  
1. Several design features of the ALR may have affected participation – being a one-off 
scheme with no certainty/possibility of ongoing funding or access to more funding and 
the small amount of money available ($100K per round). Would larger, more 
innovative bids been attracted if more money was available? 
2. The level of engagement by landholders may have been reduced (i.e. a reduced number 
of Expressions of Interest) by confusion regarding the type and intent of the project due 
to its name. The project was a tender process rather than auction and landholders 
weren’t sure what ‘recovery’ meant. The reason most given by ‘ALR-aware’ 
landholders for not participating and assigned a high importance, was a lack of clear 
understanding of the scheme (32% of respondents, n=19).  
3. The feedback to failed bidders after Round 1 was identified by some as inadequate – 
they wanted to know why they weren’t successful and where their tender fitted into the 
whole set. In Round 1 a generic letter was sent to unsuccessful landholders. In round 2 
specific feedback to each applicant was added to the generic details. This was time-
consuming to do, but evoked a positive response from landholders.  
 
How to do it better in the future 
The challenge for the future is to get the balance ‘right’ between flexibility and 
applications that contain an adequate amount of information for assessment and that can be 
assessed. As such, there needs to be a balance between the amount of guidance provided 
by the fundor and the opportunity for innovation and creativity by the tenderer.  
The uncertainty about how to assess the benefits of deep drainage contributed to their 
exclusion from round 2. In round 2, as a result, the tenders were a lot more homogeneous. 
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There is a tension here: flexible, innovative projects (including activities such as deep 
drainage) may have real benefits but they are currently impossible to evaluate in terms of 
potential outcomes. The risk is that by restricting projects to a narrow set that can be easily 
evaluated innovation may be reduced or lost.  
 
2.4 Auction design and contracting – administrative efficiency 
Relevant project objective (Table 1): 
(4) To analyse administrative efficiency of a discriminative price auction versus fixed price 
schemes. 
Policy evaluation criteria (Table 3): Economically efficient.  
Relevant Commonwealth success factors (Table 4): Mechanism design (methods employed to 
assist with design and underpinning economic ideas), engaging agents (mechanisms 
employed to exchange rights/contracts) and key change agents.  
 
Evaluation of successes 
What was the administrative efficiency of the ALR, as a discriminative price auction 
versus a fixed price scheme? From the policy evaluation criteria – was it economically 
efficient? (Table 1) 
Data from the ALR pilot auction suggest a significant increase in efficiency over an input-
based and an output-based uniform price scheme of 315 and 207% respectively (White and 
Burton 2005). In these analyses, inputs include hectares of revegetation, kilometres of 
fencing, while the output is an amount of environmental benefit, as calculated using an 
EBI or some other summed score. The ALR was economically efficient compared to fixed 
price approaches. White and Burton (2005) recommend using the lowest estimate of 
efficiency when both input and output schemes are feasible, i.e. making a conservative 
judgment about relative efficiency between schemes.  
How did the mechanism design and engaging agents contribute to the pilot’s success? 
(Table 4) 
We are unable to provide a comprehensive answer to this question without access to the 
final University of Western Australia report. The project succeeded in that the 
underpinning economic ideas were sound, and the auction design and contracting 
arrangements could be efficiently and effectively implemented. 
Success factors 
A critical success factor for the success of the project, as a pilot project, was having two 
rounds, although efficiency relative to fixed price schemes declined between the rounds. 
Burton (pers. comm. 2005) attributes the increase in tender prices in Round 2 relative to 
Round 1 to landholders costing the minimum standards recommended for proposed 
activities (such as fencing) into this second round.  
1. The two rounds were initially proposed as part of the auction design, but became 
important as a means of enabling all involved to learn and improve their approach. 
Examples of core parts of the ALR pilot that were improved between rounds included 
the SCP analysis becoming more streamlined and more guidance being provided to 
landholders to help them prepare explicitly biodiversity-focused tenders (see 
forthcoming project report for more details).  
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Also, landholders learned what was funded the first time. For example, drainage 
proposals with unclear biodiversity benefits were not funded so landholders didn’t 
attempt to get such work funded in Round 2. This flow of information, from the fundor 
to the landholder, is an example of reducing the asymmetry in information that is 
suggested as being centrally problematic to natural resource management (Stoneham et 
al. 2000) and what market-based instruments such as this pilot project have been 
designed to address.  
 
Shortcomings and associated impediments 
No shortcomings were apparent. Hailu and Schilizzi’s (2004) work suggests some caution 
with regard to broadscale adoption of repeat tenders over time. Their modelling work 
suggests that the differential benefits between one-off schemes, such as the ALR, and fixed 
price schemes may erode over time. They attribute this erosion in efficiency to individuals 
learning from their own previous bids and adjusting their next bid accordingly. 
 
2.5 Project management and resources 
Relevant Commonwealth success factors (Table 4): Project planning, management and 
communication; adequacy or otherwise of planning and organisational support.  
 
Evaluation of successes 
This project succeeded in developing and implementing two rounds of tenders with 
landholders in the WA wheatbelt, within time and budget.  
 
Success factors 
The success factors relate predominantly to how the human resources in the pilot project 
were selected and managed, including: (1) having an ‘integrator’; (2) having a mix of 
expertise, with the necessary skills; and (3) appointing locally based community support 
officers. Other success factors were: (4) having the project run by WWF and (5) good 
external and internal communication.  
1. Of critical importance to the successful running of this pilot was having one person (K. 
Williams, CSIRO) with the skills to run the SCP as well as integrating across field 
staff, project management and auction design requirements. Contributions also 
included creating a framework for field data entry as well as linking State spatial data 
sets, field data and the SCP as a decision making tool.  
2. Having a ‘science team’ who collectively held the necessary skills and expertise also 
contributed to the project’s success. Through the partnership arrangements, leading 
economists, conservation scientists and modellers were integrally involved in the 
project. The cross-disciplinary synergies within this group helped bridge the potential 
divide between economic policy instruments, biodiversity planning and on-ground 
management.  
3. Appointing locally based community support officers gave the project a local face and 
helped landholders become aware of the project and submit tenders. They were widely 
identified as pivotal to the success of the project (see section 2.3 above). Although they 
were very good at engaging landholders, their limited experience and skills affected the 
technical input they could make. This impacted on site assessment, for example being 
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able to accurately identify vegetation communities, and the delivery of well-planned 
on-ground projects. Their skills and knowledge increased over the project, emphasising 
the benefit of two rounds. 
4. The project being run by WWF gave it a ‘neutral credibility’ with landholders. Such 
neutrality may not be ascribed by rural landholders to state government departments, 
such as the Department of Conservation and Land Management, who have statutory 
responsibilities for managing public lands for nature conservation as well as protecting 
rare flora irrespective of land tenure. As such, their interest in private property with 
nature conservation values has been met with suspicion on occasions (e.g. Munro and 
Moore in press). This Department may have found it more difficult to achieve the level 
of engagement in the time frame available.  
5. Regular meetings, by the project manager, and often members of the science team as 
well, with other project partners and their staff, including NEWROC, CALM, 
Department of the Environment, Department of Agriculture, Avon Catchment Council, 
and with WA’s regional natural resource management groups (‘catchment councils’) 
contributed to recognition of the pilot and general support. The science team, although 
its members were spread across Australia, was brought together on several occasions. 
Key members met more frequently with the project manager. Closer proximity may 
have contributed to more frequent meetings and a greater shared understanding of the 
tender evaluation process and hence more contributions to resolving problems early on. 
 
Shortcomings and associated impediments 
The main impediments, in terms of project management and resources, were: (1) a short, 
tight timeframe; and (2) under-resourcing. 
1. The short, tight timeframe of the project did not make it conducive to high quality 
work. For example, it meant beginning the tender process with landholders before 
testing the tender evaluation methods. 
2. With only half of the requested budget provided but the original project objectives 
retained, under-resourcing was a significant issue. The reduced budget had a number of 
implications. For example, the lack of sufficient funding for CSIRO to develop a WA 
wheatbelt specific EBI, plus a lack of suitable data, made determining an EBI for this 
pilot problematic. For both this pilot and the Liverpool Plains one (another of the 10 
national MBI pilots) (WWF 2004), designing and organising data collection, plus 
providing adequate information and assistance to landholders, proved time-consuming 
beyond initial expectations.  
This problem seems to be a combination of initial under-resourcing combined with 
unexpectedly time-consuming elements of the project. As such, running these projects 
as pilots was a sensible approach so that these issues can be revealed and addressed 
before broadscale implementation is considered. Under-resourcing forced a strong 
reliance on co-investment, goodwill and the in-kind contributions of individuals, 
agencies and NGOs. 
A final issue with regard to resourcing was the lack of funding for compliance 
monitoring or for the evaluation of biodiversity outcomes. Although biodiversity 
outcomes were not detailed as a project objective, they are critical interest. And, if 
compliance costs of different schemes cannot be observed it makes it difficult to judge 
the relative efficiency of different approaches (White and Burton 2005). Without 
monitoring, the value or otherwise of this particular instrument can’t be determined.  
  17 
 
 
2.6 Communicating with landholders 
Relevant project objectives (Table 1): 
(5) To analyse communication strategies with landholders, and specifically, their relative 
awareness of ecological threats.  
(3) To evaluate the relative benefits of a discriminative price auction versus a fixed price 
scheme and existing Landcare schemes. In this section, this objective includes evaluating the 
change in overall quality and quantity of environmental outcomes supplied. 
Evaluation criteria (Table 3): Educational. 
Relevant Commonwealth success factor (from Table 4): None.  
 
Evaluation of successes 
The intent of analysing the pilot’s communication strategies is here narrowly focused on 
the effects on landholders’ awareness of ecological threats. Communication has been 
analysed more broadly in previous sections, as part of the analysis of landholder 
participation in the auction design and contracting evaluation section (2.3) and in the 
project management and resources evaluation (section 2.5). 
Did the pilot’s communication strategies succeed in changing landholders’ awareness 
of ecological threats? (Objective 5 – Table 1) 
What was the change in overall quality and quantity of environmental outcomes 
supplied (interpreted to mean ‘has the auction approach delivered a change in the 
work that landholders propose such that there is a change in (potential) outcomes’)? 
(Objective 3 – Table 1) 
Did the pilot project have an educational effect? (Table 3) 
There is not a simple answer to this question and given the information available in 
preparing this report, can only be answered indirectly. First, a clarification – it is more 
valuable to judge whether the project changed the types of activities undertaken by farmers 
(more biodiversity related activities due to the pilot) rather than focusing on awareness. A 
wealth of attitudinal work has shown that we all purport to be environmentally aware but 
whether that translates into actions is another matter. Landholders surveyed by UWA 
indicated that nature conservation was a core part of farm management (70% of 
respondents, n=62). Vanclay and Lawrence (1995) have described how such attitudes are 
only one of a number of factors influencing adoption. Thus, for the purposes of this 
evaluation, the focus is on actions not attitudes.  
Did this project change the actions proposed by landholders, compared to their core 
business (agricultural production) and as funded by other schemes? The first but not the 
second can be answered from the information available. In both the ALR and the Liverpool 
Plains pilot landholders showed, through the actions detailed in their tenders, a strong 
continuing interest in production-oriented environmental activities. In the ALR this 
appeared as drainage proposals and in Liverpool Plains as an interest in pasture 
establishment and refurbishment (WWF 2004). In WA (and elsewhere), most landholders 
remain focused on production concerns and the business of farming (Cary et al. 2001).  
There was, however, clear evidence of ‘learning’ what the fundors wanted between the two 
rounds of the ALR. In Round 1, 30% of landholders proposed engineering interventions 
(drainage and pumping) while in Round 2, following directed guidance in the tendering 
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process, only 1 engineering project was received. As such, the ALR succeeded in focusing 
the tendering process on biodiversity actions.  
It can also be asked whether landholders need to change their actions and awareness. For 
most landholders in the WA wheatbelt, salinity remains their highest priority irrespective 
of this project’s objectives. Many have correctly identified that if they don’t address 
salinity then biodiversity conservation may become impossible (Cramer and Hobbs 2002; 
Hodgson et al. 2004). As such, they don’t need to have their ‘awareness’ improved. What 
seems most important is continuing to pursue landscape-level, multiple benefits 
approaches to biodiversity conservation.  
 
Success factors 
The most important success factor contributing to the change in focus between rounds was 
more closely directing the tender preparation by landholders (1). Another contribution to 
communication (and potentially to the actions proposed by landholders in their tenders) 
was the various efforts to enrol bidders (2).  
1. The more directive approach taken in Round 2 resulted in almost all (except one) 
tenders having a biodiversity focus.  
2. Communication was effective in enrolling bidders. Face-to-face meetings were the 
means of engaging the majority of participants. At catchment group and LCDC 
meetings, 50-90% of attendees completed Expressions of Interest. Shire Council 
meetings provided an important forum for information exchange, as did sporting and 
other social gatherings. Farmers did not report using the website as an information 
source. Local newsletters and posters developed ‘brand recognition’. Regional 
newspapers did not stimulate responses from within the region.  
 
Shortcomings and associated impediments 
Impediments are associated with: (1) biodiversity still being outside core business for 
farmers; and (2) a lack of understanding of the concept. 
1. The results from this pilot and Liverpool Plains suggest that biodiversity is still not 
core business, even when a ‘market’ is created for it. In the Liverpool Plains pilot, even 
when the Catchment Investment Strategy recommended funding projects for native 
vegetation regeneration, the tenders and subsequent funding has gone to other activities 
(e.g. pastures). Those involved commented that the Liverpool Plains landholders can 
only cope with gradual changes in management, for example, from cropping to pasture 
rather than the more dramatic change to native vegetation regeneration (WWF 2004).  
2. It is difficult for landholders to protect biodiversity if they don’t know what ‘it’ is. 
Much of the problem associated with developing suitable projects and then detailing 
work of a suitable standard relates to this issue. In a recent survey of wheatbelt 
landholders, most (96%) gave a limited definition of biodiversity (Moore and Renton 
2002).  
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2.7 Comparison with Liverpool Plains and BushTender pilot projects 
Relevant project objective (Table 1): 
6. To identify and define the ‘key success factors’ and ‘key impediments’ for conservation 
auction schemes in Australia and the factors which are likely to be regionally sensitive. 
All three projects were based on voluntary tenders with rural landholders (Table 5). They 
all had a central interest in biodiversity, although the Liverpool Plains project was more 
broadly focused on environmental benefits. The WA project had the smallest budget 
allocated for successful bidders and the smallest number of contracts signed. All three 
relied on site-based assessments.  
Table 5 Summary of project details for Auction for Landscape Recovery (WA), Liverpool 
Plains Tender (NSW) and BushTender (Victoria) 
Feature and details ALR LP BT 
Project details 
Biodiversity services focus √ -- √ 
Funding allocated to tenderers over project $200K $735K $400K 
Areal extent (no. of LGAs/catchments) 7 LGAs 1  2 
Auction type 
First price, sealed bid, price minimisation and 
discrimination, no reserve price 
√ √ √ 
Number of rounds 2 2 (3?) 1 
Input-based tenders (where inputs include 
fencing, revegetation etc) 
√ √ √ 
Site-based assessments of tenders integral to 
evaluation 
√ √ √ 
Contract type 
Individual management agreements with 
progress payments 
√ √ √ 
Number of contracts signed 22 35 73 
Area under contract (ha) ? 7,000 3,160 
Length to be fenced (km) ? 230 ? 
Sources: Stoneham et al. (2002), WWF (2004), Clayton (2005), White and Burton (2005), 
unpublished reports from ALR project (see Appendix). 
The detail of this objective asks for information on the differences in the auction 
information requirements, landholder engagement, quantity and quality of bids and 
management interventions; administrative and communication costs, of the WA pilot and 
the Victorian and NSW (Liverpool Plains) conservation auction trials (Table 6). No data 
were available for administrative and communications costs so these features have not 
been considered. This detail is sought to answer the broader objective regarding key 
success factors and key impediments.  
  20 
 
 
Key success factors 
In terms of auction information requirements, the novelty and related success of the ALR 
lies in using the SCP. A factor potentially contributing to the success of all three pilots was 
having an expert group to assist in evaluating tenders.  
Regarding landholder engagement, both the ALR and BushTender recruited ‘new’ 
landholders – interviews with ALR landholders suggest that the flexibility of the tendering 
process and simple, short forms were appealing features.  
For quantity of bids, more tenders were received than could be funded. Additionally, there 
were more tenders submitted than initial Expressions of Interest (see EoI: Tender ratios in 
Table 6). This enthusiasm, in the ALR project at least, can be attributed to effective 
communication, the appeal of this MBI to landholders and the efforts of the community 
support officers. There is no information available to identify similar success factors or 
otherwise for the other pilots.  
Regarding quality, all three projects were regarded as being more cost-effective than 
similar fixed price schemes. Because of the different assumptions accompanying each 
calculation (Table 6) no detailed comparative comment can be made. Contributing factors 
can only be as interpreted from previous research – creating a market (price-based) for 
environmental services while reducing information asymmetry (through revealing 
information from landholders about the costs of works on their lands) and taking advantage 
of variability (heterogeneity) in landholders’ opportunity costs (Stoneham et al. 2002, 
Whitten et al. 2003, OECD 2004).  
For the quantity and quality of management interventions, the ALR and BushTender have 
a clear biodiversity focus, while the majority of the actions in the Liverpool Plains tender 
have much more of an agricultural production slant (i.e. pasture establishment and 
refurbishment) (Table 6). The success of the ALR and BushTender with regard to 
biodiversity actions can be attributed to the explicit biodiversity focus of both these 
schemes, contrasted to the Liverpool Plains scheme with its broader environmental 
benefits focus (Table 5). 
 
Key impediments 
The only place where the ALR faced impediments relative to the other schemes was with 
regard to the EBI (Table 6 – Auction information requirements). Biodiversity benefits were 
not included in the tender evaluation and the likely land use impacts of the proposed 
actions proved difficult to calculate and use. The associated factors potentially include a 
lack of information on the relationship between proposed actions and biodiversity 
outcomes, the highly diverse mosaic vegetation of this region making prediction difficult, 
and lack of resources being available to the partner (CSIRO) supplying these data.  
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Table 6. Summary of information requirements, landholder engagement, quantity (and 
quality) of bids and quantity (and quality) of proposed management interventions 
Feature and detail ALR LP BT 
Auction information requirements 
Single-price tender (no requirement for detailed 
costing of actions) 
√ √ √ 
Relied on calculating an environmental (biodiversity) 
score for each tender to identify the ‘best’ tenders 
X √ √ 
Regional conservation priority of tender part of 
evaluation 
√ √ ? 
Regional/landscape contribution of tenders as a set 
underpinned tender selection 
√ X X 
Scarcity of vegetation (i.e. conservation value) 
included in the environmental index 
? √ √ 
Amount of biodiversity improvement/benefits 
possible through tender included in environmental 
index 
X √ √ 
Other environmental benefits (e.g. salinity 
management) included in environmental index 
? √ X 
Land use change impact score part of environmental 
index  
? (in R1) √ X 
Landscape-level threats (e.g. salinity) included in 
scoring 
X ? X 
Expert panel provided advice on the practicality of 
tenders/finalisation of scoring 
√ √ √ 
Landholder engagement 
Those submitting tenders who had not previously 
participated in agri-environmental schemes (%) 
23% 
(n=31) 
? 18% not 
Landcare 
members 
Biodiversity information revealed to landholders No No No 
Habitat services information revealed to landholders N/A N/A Yes 
Feedback to landholders on lack of tender success √ √ ? 
New landholders between rounds? 15 out of 
24 (in R2) 
? ? 
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Table 6 (cont.)… 
Quantity (and quality) of bids 
Number of EoIs submitted (total) 72 ? 126 
Number of tenders submitted (total) 88 ? 148 
EoI: tender ratio 1: 1.22 ? 1; 1.17 
Number of tenders awarded 22 35 73 
Cost-effectiveness ($) relative to fixed-price 
scheme* 
2 times 3-5 times 7 times 
Quantity and quality of management interventions 
Revegetation 571 -- 372 
Fencing to exclude stock 811 -- 872 
Control rabbits 291 -- 912 
Retaining large trees  -- 822 
Native pasture establishment and refurbishment -- 403 -- 
Improved pasture establishment and refurbishment -- 443 -- 
Native vegetation establishment and refurbishment -- 63 -- 
* Each calculation is based on different assumptions: ALR figure based on a comparison with fixed 
payment per unit of input scheme (White and Burton 2005; these authors also explore other 
efficiency estimates); LP figure based on estimates of costs for similar works given in their 
Regional Investment Strategy (WWF 2004); BT figure based on a fixed price scheme where it is 
assumed to pay the marginal price determined from the auction (Stoneham et al. 2002).  
1 Calculated as the percentage of contracts within which this action is proposed. 
2 Calculated as the percentage of sites where this action is proposed. 
3 Calculated as the percentage of the total area under contract where this action is proposed. 
Sources: Stoneham et al. (2002), WWF (2004), Clayton (2005), White and Burton (2005), Anon. 
(n.d.) unpublished reports from ALR project (see Appendix). 
 
3.0 Key success factors and impediments 
 
3.1 Key success factors 
1. The availability of appropriate computer software; ability of software to capture 
economic tradeoffs. 
2. The ecological and economic models worked well together, largely because they define 
variables in a similar way.  
3. The availability of spatial data to set conservation targets. 
4. The availability of a person with insights into the mechanisms and the technical skills 
and ability to integrate data and communicate the process to a diverse range of people 
in the team (not having a person or people with similar skills/abilities would be a key 
impediment). 
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5. The development of an enthusiastic and committed project team who frequently 
contributed more time and resources to the project than the actual budget provided for.  
6. An effective mix of practical and academic disciplines to run and analyse the pilot 
project. 
7. Availability of resources to be able to employ community support officers and having 
these locally based. 
8. Using an expert reference group to facilitate decision-making. To a large extent they 
replaced a formal analysis of feasibility and likelihood of success of projects. 
9. Two bidding rounds. Originally conceived as part of auction design, the two rounds 
enabled key learnings from Round 1 to be instituted in Round 2. The pilot was much 
stronger, with more reliable results, because of this.  
 
3.2 Key impediments 
1. The project timeframe impacted on many aspects of the project. 
2. The budget also constrained many aspects of the project, including the actual operation 
of the tender process and ability to fund projects with meaningful environmental 
outcomes. The project relied, critically, on significant in-kind contributions and this did 
not always provide the necessary resources or input at key times. It also caused strain 
with a key partner at a critical time.  
3. The methodology behind the EBI is complex and requires a large amount of 
assessment at different scales, which can only be carried out by 
experienced/knowledgeable individuals, and/or in conjunction with an expert reference 
group. 
4. The inability to develop or use effective management benefit analysis and threat/risk 
analysis. Methods already used in other projects are of questionable value, especially 
when transferred to a new environment. A dedicated research program is required to 
develop this area and provide workable and meaningful methodologies. Reliable 
scientific information on the nature of the relationships between land use change and 
ecosystem impacts is critical for the functioning of environmental markets (Whitten et 
al. 2003).  
5. The SCP process is difficult to communicate, given its conceptual and computational 
complexity.  
6. While we identified above, the availability of spatial data as allowing the development 
of a set of ecosystem types against which targets could be set as a success factor, there 
were also significant limitations relating to using such data for this purpose. This is a 
particular issue in the extremely diverse SW ecoregion and one that confounds the 
application of simple mapping, selection and prioritisation processes. 
7. Appropriate spatial data are not available ‘off the shelf’ or from a central location in 
Western Australia for use at a regional scale of analysis, meaning that it is time 
consuming to convert/interpret for regional use.  
 
4.0 Discussion and conclusions 
The ALR project has attempted to use biodiversity decision-making tools to design and run 
a conservation auction process at a sub-regional scale. The project had a number of 
limitations imposed by timeframe, budget, personnel availability and the characteristics of 
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the selected study area. Despite this, the project succeeded in pulling together a number of 
different approaches, deriving a set of conservation targets, and assessing tenders against 
their likely contribution to these targets.   
Problems encountered during the project, over and above those arising from timeframe, 
budget etc, are symptomatic of broader issues in planning for biodiversity conservation. 
The prime tensions in all attempts to prioritise conservation actions centre on the following 
set of considerations: 
1. The desire to produce meaningful, simple and easy to apply indices of biodiversity 
benefits in terms of current and future conditions versus the need for comprehensive 
data on current biodiversity patterns and condition and a systematic assessment of 
these data.  
2. The alternative approaches of applying priority setting on a case-by-case basis in the 
face of incomplete information versus attempting to derive a complete-as-possible data 
set from which to make systematic decisions (recognising the near-impossibility of 
achieving a complete dataset and the need to use surrogate measures).  
3. The requirement to determine priorities based on multiple factors including current 
biodiversity value, degree of threat, and likelihood of successful management 
outcomes (Hobbs and Kristjanson 2003, Hobbs et al. 2003) 
4. The recognition that quantitative analytical methods can only provide decision support 
tools, not complete selection methodologies, and that subjective and value-based 
decisions are required. Hence the likely need to involve expert reference groups (such 
as the MARG in this project) to interpret the analyses and assist with decisions. 
5. Funding limitations always mean partial solutions and hence tradeoffs among the 
factors discussed in (2) are inevitable. These will require value-based judgements 
regardless of the quality of information available. For instance, is it better to fund 
projects on high value biodiversity assets that have a relatively low chance of 
successful outcomes or lower value assets with a higher chance of success?  
6. The current and potential biodiversity values comprise both site and landscape 
components. Individual sites sit within a landscape context which may currently add or 
subtract value, depending on whether it enhances viability, connectivity etc. Again, 
there is the potential for variables to confound one another.  
7. This needs to be recognised when aggregate indices such as BBI or EBI are used: high 
scores on site-based parameters may be negated by low scores on landscape 
parameters, or vice versa.  The problems associated with constructing apparently 
simple metrics such as BBI have been discussed in detail by Williams (2004). 
8. The need to key local actions into sub-regional and regional priority setting exercises, 
usually in the face of incomplete information, and uneven distribution of willingness 
and ability of landholders to participate. 
9. The need to set biodiversity priorities in the context of other major land use issues, 
such as salinity management, with the likelihood that biodiversity management may 
either operate at a different scale from other processes and/or that biodiversity 
management per se may be irrelevant if the other issues are not tackled effectively at 
the same time. 
10. All of the above points need to be considered in the broader context of community 
understanding of the concept of biodiversity. While regional groups are being asked to 
set regional biodiversity targets, there is frequently still a poor understanding of what is 
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meant by biodiversity and what it consists of (Moore and Renton 2002). This militates 
against both a consistent approach to the issue and broad community buy-in to it. 
The following influences on landholders’ responses to this scheme are also of fundamental 
importance in the further development of biodiversity policy instruments:  
1. Natural biodiversity, the focus of the ALR, is not well understood by many 
landholders. Often they do not share the same definition as scientists and others 
involved in scientifically based conservation planning (Moore and Renton 2002). 
Landholders preparing biodiversity tenders may not clearly understand what outcomes 
are expected of them. 
2. Farms are run as businesses so families and companies expect to make a positive 
economic return from them. Landholders are most attracted to conservation actions that 
provide an economic return. Price-based instruments, such as tenders, thus have appeal. 
This appeal is tempered by the risk-adverse nature of many landholders (Vanclay and 
Lawrence 1995, Munro and Moore in press) combined with their persistent adherence 
to traditional agricultural pursuits.  
3. Although these auction schemes have led to increased biodiversity activity, there has 
been a continued focus on broader production issues. This creates a conundrum – to 
achieve widespread adoption, instruments need to appeal to broader production 
concerns, but the evidence to-date is that when they do, the attention given to 
biodiversity is limited (as evidenced by the Liverpool Plains results). Any development 
of policy instruments must remain cognizant that psychological, cultural and political 
factors may dominate over economic ones (Sterner 2003).  
4. While it is important to understand landholders’ attitudes, they are not good predictors 
of behaviour (Vanclay and Lawrence 1995). It is critical to move the discussion 
beyond trying to ‘change farmer’s attitudes’ to determining the factors that enhance the 
adoption of changed practices. These market-based pilots provide an excellent example 
of real-life experiments to investigate the impediments and incentives for change.  
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